“Al-Sharaa must be put under pressure”

Interview by Hannah El-Hitami 

Ms. Aldoughli, in December 2024, rebel militias led by Hai'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad. Could you tell me what has worked out well since then?

Immediately after Assad's fall, the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, was very popular because he had pulled off something that many had thought impossible: a largely peaceful transition without bloodshed. Al-Sharaa sent a strong message calling for inclusion and renunciation of revenge, as well as promising security and representation for all Syrians. The first month sparked hope both within the country and internationally. Representatives from several states expressed cautious recognition, and the security situation and local governance also improved. However, as the new state was built, internal divisions increasingly emerged.

One of the biggest challenges is the more than 100 armed groups that have emerged over the past 14 years. In his “victory speech” on January 29, 2025, Al-Sharaa announced that they would all be integrated into the army. How is that going so far?

This step was primarily symbolic and came about very abruptly. There had been no prior negotiations and no legal framework for integration. From my field research, I know that most commanders—even the leaders of central groups—were not informed that their groups were to be disbanded. A commander of the Maghawir al-Sham militia told me that they were summoned to the ceremony without knowing in advance that it would mean the end of their military command. The result was not cohesion—but confusion. Al-Sharaa treated armed groups as monolithic blocs. However, as my research shows, the motivations of the fighters are complex and multi-layered. For many members of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), the reasons range from personal grievances, trauma, and revolutionary ideals to ethnicity, the will to survive, and material hardship. Integrating these fighters requires an understanding of what their loyalties are based on, how they define dignity, and what political future they envision for themselves.

What could Al-Sharaa have done differently?

First, a national security dialogue should have been launched involving elected representatives from all factions—including the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and southern coalitions. This would help develop a shared vision for the military. Second, a transitional command structure should have been introduced that preserves the dignity of mid-level commanders while ensuring civilian control. Third, demobilization and reintegration packages could have been offered that reflect the motivations of the fighters. Finally, symbolic gestures of inclusion, such as public guarantees to protect former regime soldiers who switch sides, could have created a broader social contract around the army.

The current chaos and sectarian tensions clearly show that Al-Sharaa has very little control over his troops. In times of tension, the lack of a central command structure leads to violations such as those we have seen in the coastal region and in Suwaida.

In Suwaida, fighting broke out in July between Druze and Bedouin communities. Hundreds, according to some sources well over a thousand people were killed, including many civilians. Government troops are also said to have been involved. What are the causes of the violence in Suwaida? And what explains the attacks on Alawite communities along the coast in March?

One of the root causes is the absence of any genuine political vision for post-Assad Syria. The interim government continues to act less like a state and more like an armed group that happened to seize power.  

There is still no serious effort to move beyond military logic toward inclusive governance. A consultative process should bring together Syria's diverse communities to debate competing visions for the state, centralised, federal or otherwise.  

Instead, the leadership has imposed a rigid, security-driven model from the top down. Syria cannot be built through exclusion or coercion. Syrians need a space to negotiate the form, identity and authority of their future state.

After decades of politically instrumentalised sectarianism, and now violence against Alawite and Druze communities, what is needed to build trust between different communities? 

During the fighting in Suwayda, for example, there were dozens of civil society initiatives from both Druze and Bedouin communities. They were cooperating to evacuate families and protect civilians, sharing their tears, their grievances, even saying sorry to each other for the killings. The state needs to focus on these initiatives that challenge sectarianism. It should not try to control or take charge of them but empower them.  

At the same time, the state needs to avoid using sectarian narratives in the media and official statements. There have always been rivalries between different communities, but it is the responsibility of the political leadership to try and manage that instead of using one party against the other. 

In February, President al-Sharaa called for a “national dialogue” conference where he advocated for unity in the country. Was this merely symbolic? 

The National Dialogue was a missed opportunity. It excluded key actors such as the Druze leadership, the SDF and representatives of civil society from former opposition areas. There was no real attempt to engage with Syria's pluralism, let alone accommodate different governance preferences. The result has been a political landscape where grievances are left to fester, dialogue is hollow and power is imposed rather than negotiated.  

Where else is that apparent? 

We see that membership of different state committees is mostly made up of previous members of HTS. This casts doubts among Syrians that this government is really willing to include different opinions.  

Syrians asking for a more inclusive government do not just mean minority representation. This goes beyond labelling or categorising them into different sects. It is about different political perceptions that need to be represented. 

What about political parties?

One big mistake al-Sharaa made, and part of the reason for the recent outbreak of violence, is that he dissolved all political parties. Currently, no parties are allowed. But there is a need for political parties; otherwise, people have only guns with which to express their political views. The government has to establish channels for people to peacefully organise themselves politically. 

What is the situation within state institutions like the police and judiciary? 

The police force is still weak, undertrained, and lacks public trust. A large portion of the original staff left after the regime's fall, and the newly recruited officers are inexperienced.  

The judiciary, meanwhile, was non-functional for about six months and only resumed partial operation in July. The system for holding criminals accountable is not currently functioning. There is no coherent institutional roadmap, no vision for transitional justice or legal reform, so most judicial mechanisms remain suspended or symbolic.  

In this institutional vacuum, various local actors and factions have taken security into their own hands, deepening fragmentation. 

What did the constitutional declaration in March reveal about the path the new government is taking? 

The constitutional declaration reflects the new government's emphasis on centralisation and military-led governance. While it offers some notable provisions, such as promises of rights based on international treaties and the establishment of a transitional justice commission, it ultimately consolidates power in the presidency, with little separation of powers or real mechanisms for accountability. 

Crucially, the declaration omits any roadmap for developing a permanent constitution, revealing the absence of a genuine democratic transition. Although it gestures toward turning the page on Syria's authoritarian past, it fails to enable the inclusive national dialogue needed to address Syria's political diversity. 

How should European governments support Syria right now? 

European governments should support Syria in a balanced and principled manner. The current government is transitioning from a fragmented non-state actor, shaped by years of war, sanctions and armed struggle, into a central authority attempting to reconstitute itself as a rational state actor.

That transformation should be encouraged, but not unconditionally. Al-Sharaa must be put under pressure to abandon the militaristic logic of his movement and embrace an inclusive and transparent political process. Support for justice and reconciliation must go beyond tokenistic initiatives. It should be rooted in mechanisms that engage diverse Syrian communities, redress past grievances and ensure transitional accountability, not merely stabilise the status quo. 

After an initial phase of euphoria, Syria is now going through a very hard time. Has the opportunity for a peaceful transition passed? 

I am hesitant to give up on this government. Despite its many failures, I still hope it can reform itself. But the window for a peaceful transition is rapidly narrowing. Syria is now entangled in deep internal fragmentation and intensifying regional interference. The recent Israeli strikes, particularly in the South, signal a dangerous shift. Syrians are increasingly stripped of political agency, caught between a government resistant to reform and foreign powers imposing their agendas.  

Like many, I am torn: either continue to support an interim government that shows little sign of meaningful change, or risk Syria's disintegration, with Israel expanding its influence in the South, Turkey entrenching itself in the North, and no inclusive national vision emerging.  

However, here comes the role of the international community, especially Western actors, in pushing for a more inclusive, consultative political process that safeguards both Syrian aspirations and Western strategic interests.