“China is being idealised”

Ms Drinhausen, is the Chinese Communist Party maybe a little bit obsessed with the West?

Beijing has long sought to stand as an alternative to the Western-dominated order; this has been a central goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for some time. The official narrative is that China suffered a “century of national humiliation” at the hands of Western powers and Japan between 1839 and 1949. Under the leadership of the CCP, the country is supposed to resume its central place on the world stage.

Does China want to be on an equal footing with the West — or seek to be the dominant force?

Officially, China advocates equality and diversity among different worldviews and systems in its dealings with the international community, while simultaneously viewing itself in a leadership role. The drive to shape global discourse is fuelled by a fear of being culturally undermined by the West. To prevent this, China seeks to break the West’s dominance over values and assert its own norms and visions. Some of these, however, are incompatible with liberal values.

You are talking about cultural values and norms. Is that another way of saying “soft power”?

That is an important point. But we must not overlook the fact that, at its core, this is about political values. In China, culture is shaped politically to a much greater extent than in liberal democracies. The era of the Cultural Revolution under Mao may belong to the past, but culture is still understood as an instrument of power wielded by the party-state.

How do the political value systems of Europe and China differ?

China describes itself as a democracy, but its political system is designed to ensure the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to power. Another example: in Europe, right now we often talk about digital or cognitive “sovereignty” — that is, the ability to make economic and technological decisions without abandoning our own democratic principles. Xi Jinping, by contrast, often speaks of “ideological security”, meaning protection against “harmful” influences and ideas from abroad. Having largely brought domestic debates into line through censorship, now Beijing is increasingly turning its attention to shaping discourse and public opinion internationally.

“The Chinese government is increasingly positing itself as a neutral mediator in international conflicts”

How does China want to be seen by the international community?

China wants to be viewed as a responsible major power, as a patron of the weak and oppressed. This can be seen in the regular statements issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in submissions to the United Nations and in Xi Jinping’s speeches. These are deliberately aimed at the Global South, with China consciously positioning itself as a counterweight to the United States, which it portrays as aggressive, and to its values. “They interfere, we stay out” is a rough summary of this stance.

So it presents itself as a guardian of peace?

Exactly. The Chinese government is increasingly offering itself as a neutral mediator in international conflicts. Wherever China does intervene and issue threats —  towards Taiwan, for example — the matter is declared an internal affair.

How does this values-based language tie in with economic policy?

The interplay between China’s political rhetoric and its trade policy has often been underestimated in the West. Projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative were initially dismissed with a degree of derision. But whether someone runs a company or is a provincial official tasked with promoting the local economy in some way, if everyone presents their activities as part of the same initiative, such a political label can acquire enormous reach and help create the image of an integrated global economic development and infrastructure project.

So does China have a grand narrative about the future, whereas we don’t?

At the very least, China has better PR. One example: European countries still provide substantial amounts of development aid, but they rarely highlight it as a joint contribution. China takes a different approach, skilfully presenting itself as a partner to the Global South. There is another factor, too: Chinese aid and investment come with fewer conditions attached, creating the impression of dealing on an equal footing. Emerging economic powers are very aware of this.

What does good made-in-China PR look like?

Since 2021, China has launched a series of global initiatives on development, security and other issues, most recently the “Global Governance Initiative” in 2025 (a proposal for a multipolar world order that emphasises state sovereignty and gives greater weight to the interests of the Global South, ed.). All these projects have the word “global” in their titles, signalling that China wants itself to speak on behalf of the international community.

And do these initiatives have real-life consequences?

Absolutely. Soft power is a major project in China. Political initiatives are given substance through strategic guidelines, funding programmes, summits and other formats. A think tank was recently established in Beijing to support the implementation of the “Global Civilization Initiative”. China is also becoming increasingly active in science diplomacy, through research partnerships and scholarships. All of this is intended to bring Chinese positions and values more strongly into international discourse.

“Chinese fashion platforms, electric-car manufacturers, chatbot and AI providers are conquering international markets and changing the image of the People’s Republic in the process”

Cultural appeal has always been part of hegemonic ambitions. The Americans exported Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, along with values such as freedom and a particular notion of coolness. Do the Chinese now want to copy this, ultimately using it as a form of image-building?

Definitely. But while US governments spent decades trying to boost the visibility of independent cultural products such as Hollywood films, the Chinese Communist Party thinks it knows best what will be popular abroad. The result has included calligraphy courses and translations of Xi Jinping’s books. This is certainly partly because Xi’s vision of Chinese culture tends to be conservative, while cultural figures face political restrictions. In terms of soft power, it was hardly a hit.

Is it working better today?

Over the past five to ten years, Beijing has begun making its stance more compatible with international debates. Chinese cultural products still lack the appeal of American pop culture, but Chinese technology products, fashion, food and lifestyle are sparking growing interest abroad – even without the party’s involvement. Terms such as “China Speed” and the social-media trend “Chinamaxxing” both highlight China’s growing soft power.

And then there is TikTok, by far the most influential social media app to come out of China.

TikTok is a good example of the broad reach that innovative products can achieve when they know how to appeal to consumers around the world. Chinese fashion platforms, electric vehicle manufacturers, chatbot and AI providers are also conquering international markets and, in the process, changing the image of the People’s Republic. On social media, China is increasingly being idealised as a techno-futuristic place of longing, while the West is supposedly in decline. There is a new wave of international influencers coming to China, some of them invited or supported by government agencies. The Chinese state hopes that positive content will gradually displace negative reporting in the long term.

Isn’t there a contradiction in aiming to look cool and innovative while still wanting to keep everything under control?

The Party has repeatedly silenced people or put them in prison because they were considered a threat to the system, such as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. This security reflex has inflicted an enormous amount of damage. But from the Party’s perspective, these internal contradictions have now largely been brought under control. On top of that, the United States under Trump has, in recent years, done its competitor a favour by damaging its own image. By comparison, China looks much better today.

What role does AI play in all this?

Well, that's fascinating. Try asking an AI chatbot, whatever model, whether China is a responsible global power.

Wait … this is what ChatGPT says: “Today, China assumes responsibility in many areas that come with its status as a major power, while consistently pursuing its own strategic interests. Whether this qualifies it as a ‘responsible global power’ depends largely on the standards applied – for example, human rights, international cooperation, sovereignty, or the rules-based international order.”

There is this recurring juxtaposition between international, often critical analysis and the Chinese counter-narrative. Look at ChatGPT. This is because there are an enormous number of documents explaining China’s perspective and claiming that criticism is factually incorrect or simply based on misunderstandings. And these documents are ingested by AI systems and can carry significant weight compared with other information.

“I would say that the transition from discursive soft power toward a gradual transformation of the postwar institutional order has already begun”

What struck me when I was ucivilsing AI during my research for this interview was how nuanced the portrayal of China is, and how often I was warned not to repeat Western stereotypes.

We must not forget that AI systems are designed to strive for balance and do not have a value system of their own. This is certainly a competitive advantage for the Chinese position, and it will change public perceptions of the country in the near future. After all, the official line is that China stands for democracy, inclusivity and diversity, for the equality of different civilizations and respect for differences.

That sounds very liberal.

Absolutely, although this image quickly falls apart when you take a deeper look at Chinese discourse. At the same time, we continue to underestimate how much influence China will have in five to ten years, including at the regulatory level, particularly when it comes to international norms in emerging fields such as AI. Personally, I would say that the transition from discursive soft power toward a gradual transformation of the postwar institutional order has already begun.

And you also advise German politicians. Do they realise how far China has pulled ahead?

Basically, yes. But we still tend to project our own logic and models of thinking onto China. At present, economic and technological issues dominate political attention. Yet the influence of political language and cultural narratives is underestimated. The United States has recently relied almost exclusively on hard power. China, by contrast, recognizes the importance of soft power. We should take that seriously.